by Macharia Munene
China is a big country in terms of geography and demography but its bigness is more than in territory and population. It is in, its quiet rise as the possible determinant of what the world does or thinks economically or in terms of geopolitics. This rise and global acceptability is seemingly at the expense of the Europeans, meaning mostly Western Europe, and North America and the countries that subscribe to the idea that everything positive comes from the Conceptual West. This acceptability is a modern phenomenon that defies Euro strategists partly because China is seemingly taking their self-appointed role as world decision makers and shapers of global opinion.
What bothers the Europeans who then talk of the new China threat, particularly in Africa, it seems, is that the Euros ignored the signs of the rise from the East. The reasons for initially ignoring the signs include outright racism that places the Euros above everyone else, certainly above the Africans. As products of “enlightenment” based on the thoughts of Immanuel Kant and John Locke that privileged white superiority over any other people, the Euros had – and still have – problems accepting that people who are not of European extraction can positively contribute to society. It is that type of racism that made them blind to the reality taking place and China noticed that Euro-blindness.
China took advantage of Euro blindness to the concerns and interests of other people and determined not to repeat its past mistakes of being excessively inward looking, smoothly started penetrating the rest of the globe. China opened up and went out of its zone, studied the Euros led by the United States and Britain, and learned from them but remained focused on China’s desire to do two things: Improve the lives of the Chinese people and assert the Chinese presence as a geopolitical player.
Asserting global presence called for alternating softness and hardness, as represented in the Confucian thoughts, Guanxi and Yitzan, demands for reciprocity and readiness for righteous warfare. The difference is to know when to be hard, when to be soft, and on or to whom either should apply. The strategy of hardness alternating with softness is therefore not new given that the very territory that is China is a product of hard internal wars accompanied by diplomatic interactions in the process of incorporation right from the establishment of the Qin state in 221 BCE. Hardness and softness, therefore, is part of Chinese continuous strategy on statecraft and international relations.
This strategy succeeded and enabled modern China to penetrate the rest of the world without much fuss. It emerged as a global force to reckon with rather than to ridicule. It quietly flexes its geopolitical muscle while brilliantly downplaying its strength. When the Euros woke up, they started complaining about some “New China Threat” without specifying what the “old” threat was. It turns out that the narrative of the China threat is a Euro reaction by former colonial powers in Africa trying to protect their perceived interests in previous colonial states. The “threat” narrative, therefore, targets Chinese successes in Africa rather than in Europe. Subsequently, the impression that comes up is that the Euros would like to mediate African/Chinese relations rather than have the two regions deal with each other directly.
The Euro search for a mediation role in the relations between African countries and China, however, flounders partly because it is unreal. First, for former colonial masters to purport to instruct African policy makers on what is good or bad for their countries is insulting to common sense. The China threat narrative simply implies that African leaders are stupid and therefore need guidance from colonial masters. Second, the narrative is itself an admission of Euro-inadequacies in changing global dynamics where each country is looking for its geopolitical niche in world power realignment. Third, it shows that Euro powers are time stagnant and therefore out of tune with reality. In contrast, China appears to have adjusted to the changing realities so well that ends up offering guidance to the rest of the world.
China’s emergence as controller of world opinion was in two phases, having the same objective of advancing and protecting Chinese interests by being outward looking rather than being inwardly blind. First, after Chairman Mao’s death, China attracted Euro attention because of Deng Xiaoping’s entertaining homilies with his “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” that called for Chinese economic cats, irrespective of their colour, to catch mice. And the Chinese economy boomed so much that economically China stopped being a Third World country by leaping over Euro economies to emerge second only to the United States. The second phase is that of Xi Jinping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristic for the New Era” that stresses advancing Chinese interests beyond Chinese borders. While initially the Euros were amused by Deng’s cat analogies, they are extremely concerned with visible successes of Xi Jingpin’s global dual strategy of One Belt One Road Initiative and the Common Destiny of Shared Values that is in deep contrast with growing Euro nationalist isolationism.
The Euro narrative on the new China threat, therefore, is largely based on geopolitical envy. It is part of their regrouping and reassessing global positioning in a changing world where they no longer are top. The Euros are trying hard to figure out how to advance and protect their interests in Africa; discrediting China through the New Threat Narrative is simply one of the tools. It is doubtful whether the strategy will work well in the long run because the African countries are also looking after their interests the best way they know how. Interacting with an outward looking China is one of the best “How”.
Macharia Munene is a professor of history and international relations.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect or represent any official or unofficial position of CGTN, CGTN Africa, its employees or management.
