Djibouti’s important place in China’s Belt and Road strategy
Djibouti is situated in the Horn of Africa, next to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow passage between the southern tip of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. An estimated 12.5 – 20 percent of global trade passes through that strait every year. Djibouti’s strategic geographical location also makes it extremely valuable in a geopolitical sense. The United States’ only permanent military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier, is in Djibouti. In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in the world in Djibouti, just a few miles from Camp Lemonnier. The opening demonstrates China’s growing international presence and power projection, i.e., its ability to rapidly deploy economic aid, military power or political pressure to parts of the world.
Under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt, and Road’ Initiative (BRI), China invests significantly in strategic locations throughout the world. China’s foreign policy is based on Xi’s belief in “win-win” partnerships. He sees other countries as equals regardless of their sizes or levels of development.
But as China’s global power grows so does its ability to influence other states. Critics argue that small or developing countries like Djibouti provide easier targets because they are inexpensive to win over. With Djibouti’s debt ballooning from 60.5 percent of GDP in 2014 to 88 percent in 2017, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank have warned Djibouti against becoming too dependent on other states. A report from the Centre for Global Development found that China has provided funding of around USD 1.4 billion for Djibouti’s major investment projects, equivalent to roughly 75 percent of Djibouti’s GDP, partly confirming critics’ fears of potential mortgage of national economies to foreign powers.
China consistently argues that its interest in Djibouti is mutual economic development and that the Chinese military base there supports peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Africa and West Asia. In 2017, foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang stated that the base would enable China to make “new and greater contributions” to peace in Africa and the world and would benefit Djibouti’s economic development. In defence of this position, Beijing often cites its ‘non-interference’ policy, which has been championed in Chinese foreign policy for several decades.
China adopts a ‘case-by-case’ approach on how to manage debt claims. In some cases, such as Burundi and Afghanistan, China has forgiven 100 percent of the debt these countries owed. In other cases, such as Tajikistan, it is said to have sought to acquire 1,158 square kilometres of disputed territory in exchange for debt relief. There’s no reason to believe that China can’t or will not consider a similar approach in Djibouti.
The U.S. will be concerned regardless of how China decides to act in Djibouti. America’s chief concern is that the Djiboutian government, forced by mounting debt to China, will hand over control of Camp Lemonnier to China. Second, two out of five terminals in Djibouti are already under Chinese control. The opening of the military base next to two areas of active hostilities – Somalia and Yemen – and the US’ Camp Lemonnier, and Djibouti’s increasing dependence on China, create further tensions between the two strategic competitors.
Often overlooked in this discussion on big power games in the Horn of Africa is the fate of Djibouti and its citizens. How does Djibouti leverage its importance to BRI while maintaining control of that strategically important port..and its government? The Fund for Peace, which publishes the annual Fragile States Index, already registers Djibouti as a “very high warning” risk of state collapse. But it also offers Djibouti a solution. First, Djibouti should view foreign investment with caution and the government should more closely monitor public debt. Djibouti should also promote Pan-Africanism and regional ties with its neighbors through trade agreements and free trading zones which offer more economic gain than hosting military bases. Increased tensions between two of its giant tenants (China and the U.S.) and unhealthy dependency on foreign loans create a chess game-like situation in which Djibouti runs the risk of becoming the pawn on its own territory, especially as the West grows more worried about Chinese military and economic influence in Africa and other parts of the developing world.